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Were ignored: (1) that a merely declaratory resolution approved

without the formalities prescribed as essential to the passage of
a law cannot be given legal effect as a definitive expression of
legislative will, and (2) that it is not within the province of the
legislature to construe the enactments of a previous legislature.6

PUBLIC UTILITIES
Melvin G. Dakin*
Station Closings
As has been evident in prior terms, the Louisiana Public
Service Commission has set up more rigorous standards to justify station closings than the railroads have been willing to accept;
consequently, recent terms have seen a flurry of such cases reach
the Supreme Court and this term with six such cases was no
exception.' The guide which the court has followed was adopted
some years ago from a statement in Corpus Juris Secundum and
was recently phrased as follows:
6. There have been other instances of expository legislation and interpretative
resolutions by the Louisiana legislature, but thus far no question has arisen as
to their validity. See, for example, H. C. R. No. 29 of 1955 interpreting certain
language in LA. R.S. 3:2809 (1950), by declaring it the intent of the legislature
to confer upon the Department of Highways the authority to approve the erection
of fences on the rights-of-way of public roads; S.C.R. No. 7, 1960 (E.S.), stating
that the legislature, in enacting R.S. 18:231-18:261, intended to confer the right
on parishes, not only to adopt the system of permanent registration of voters, but
also to confer the right to rescind such action once taken, and to revert to the
system of periodic registration; S.C.R. No. 10, 1960 (2 E.S.), whereby the legislature expresses its intention "that no member of the Armed Forces of the
United States of America who are citizens of Louisiana . . . should be required
to pay a license fee in order to hunt or fish . . . " thus exempting them from the
license fees imposed by LA. R.S. 56:104 and R.S. 56:331. In addition there are
numerous other resolutions suspending the operation of existing law, some for an
indefinite period. See for example, H.C.R. No. 2, 1960 (1 E.S.), suspending
until May 1, 1961, the operation of La. Act 357 of 1960; H.C.R. No. 8, 1960
(1 E.S.), suspending indefinitely Act 216 of 1960; H.C.R. No. 25, 1960 (1 E.S.),
suspending indefinitely the provisions of R.S. 13:3471(6).
Indefinite suspension of laws amounts to a virtual repeal, and consequently the
practice is unsound since laws can only be repealed by other laws enacted in accordance with constitutional safeguards.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Louisiana & Arkansas Ry. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 240
La. 658, 124 So.2d 899 (1960) ; Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Louisiana Public Service
Commission, 240 La. 669, 124 So.2d 902 (1960) ; Illinois Central R.R. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 240 La. 769, 125 So.2d 159 (1960) ; Illinois
Central R.R. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 241 La. 1, 127 So.2d 178
(1961) ; Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 241 La.
242, 128 So.2d 644 (1961) ; Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Louisiana Public
Service Commission, 130 So.2d 398 (La. 1961).
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". the test employed in determining whether or not a railroad may properly be entitled to discontinue an agency station, where an absolutely necessary service is not involved,
is whether the public good derived from maintenance of the
agency station outweighs the expense to the railroad in continuing such agency. In determining such matters consideration should be given to the volume of business done at the
station, its proximity to other stations, the accessibility
thereof, the cost of maintaining such agency station, the financial loss, if any, to the railroad, giving due regard to the
welfare of the public and the probabilities of future develop2
ment."
The evidence adduced by the railroads usually takes the form
of financial data showing stations are operating at an actual loss
or, at best, a small profit. A proposal to close a station is usually accompanied by an offer on the part of the railroad to handle
the business of the closed station at neighboring stations with
telephone tolls involved absorbed by the railroad. Community
resistance prompts evidence as to the unsatisfactoriness of such
substitute service and as to the public convenience and necessity
4
generally which requires maintenance of station service.
Sharpest conflict has centered around the methods utilized by
the railroads in calculating profit or loss on station operations.
The Commission seems to make the uncomplicated assumption
that if net cash is yielded by the station in an excess of cash
revenues over out-of-pocket expenses at the station, there is, if
not a profit, at least not a loss such as to warrant closing the
2. Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 241
La. 1, 127 So.2d 178, 181 (1961). See also Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 235 La. 973, 106 So.2d 438, 441 (1958) ; C.J.S
Railroads § 402c(2) (1952).
3. A typical judicial finding of fact is quoted at 127 So.2d 178, 181 (La.
1961) : "[lilt appeared that the freight could be adequately handled at adjoining
stations, the only inconvenience being that the shippers or consignees would be
required to make long distance calls which would be paid for by the railroad."
4. Often the railroad is paralleled by modern hard-surface highways with truck
lines in existence adequate to render the less than carload service of which the
public may be deprived by the railroad. Frequently, the railroads themselves
render truck way service as auxiliary and supplementary to rail service; they
must, of course, satisfy the usual requisites under the State Motor Carrier legislation that public convenience and necessity will be promoted by granting certificates. LA. R.S. 45:164 (1950). See Illinois Central R.R. v. Louisiana Public
Service Commission, 240 La. 854, 125 So.2d 387 (1961) for a recent application
denied by the commission but remanded for additional evidence on the adequacy
of the existing service on which the denial was based. The strongest plea for continuation of service is often based on hopes and expectations for future development of the community. Id. at 667, 124 So.2d at 902.
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station. The railroad, on the other hand, attempts to determine
profit or loss with more precision. Thus, as to interline freight,
it removes from the station the portion of freight charges to be
turned over to other railroads. 6 As to so-called local freight, it
is argued that "here, too, good accounting theory dictates that
there be a division of the freight charges collected between the
two stations performing services in connection with this shipment . . . the one used by . . . [the railroad] is to divide the
charges equally between the forwarding and the receiving stations."7 "The charges" which the railroad divides equally with
the station proposed to be closed consist in the charges on all
freight originating in such station, whether collect or prepaid,
and all freight terminating in such station, whether collect or
prepaid, from other points on the petitioning railroad. While
simply taking the total cash receipts from local traffic at the
station in question might achieve division of such charges, it is
apparent that cash collections would be affected by the irrelevant
circumstance of whether consignors and consignees chose to ship
prepaid or collect. While equal division of the total charges may
not achieve complete equity either, it seems superior to the relatively fortuitous operation of cash collections. Proration of system-wide expenses to a station on the basis of the ratio of such
system expenses to total revenue seems unexceptionable from an
accounting point of view although it is probably less precise than
some other methods which could be suggested. 8
This regulatory function may well pass to the Interstate
Commerce Commission unless a less cumbersome process than
litigation of each case is formulated at the state level.9
5. "Not only did the Commission credit all the business done at Tickfaw, both
inbound and outbound, to that station but [it] did not allocate any of the systemwide expense to this station . . . the Commission concluded . . . that in view of

the obvious need of the agency -by the shippers in the locality the public convenience and necessity require the continued operation of the Tickfaw station."
240 La. 769, 774-75, 125 So.2d 159, 160 (1960).
6. For exposition of the method in some detail, see Missouri Pacific R.R. v.
Louisiana Public Service Commission, 238 La. 243, 115 So.2d 337 (1959),
Supreme Court Docket No. 44586, Original Brief, Appellant pp. 8-9. See also
The Work of the Supreme Court for the 1959-1960 Term -Public
Utilities, 21
LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 350 (1961).
7. Ibid.
8. Id. at 248, 115 So.2d at 339: The court held that in determining whether
a particular freight station is operated at a profit or loss, consideration should
be given to the station's proportionate share of the general operating expenses
in the absence of eopert evidence in the record that the railroad's method of accounting is incorrect.
9. "Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate interstate commerce, may determine whether the burdens imposed on it by state regulation,
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Certificates of Convenience and Necessity
Several certification problems reached the court from the
Commission this term; of some interest was one which required
an interpretation of legislative intent in specifying a showing of
material promotion of the public convenience and necessity for
the issuance of an additional motor carrier certificate where
there is an existing certificate. 10 In the court's view, this was
translated as a requirement that there be substantial evidence,
and not just some evidence, that the additional certification was
needed." Presumably, this means that after the applicant's
showing of need has been met by countervailing evidence, there
still must survive a demonstrated need for additional service.
Among other extensions, the certificate sought "closed door
traffic" from New Orleans to Abbeville as an extension of its
way service between Abbeville and Cameron. But New Orleans
to Abbeville is already served by other carriers who testified of
their willingness to interchange freight with applicant at Abbeville and of the fact that "closed door service" to New Orleans
by applicant would deprive them of a most desirable portion of
the traffic without contributing any service not already available through adequate interchange agreements. Thus, the policy
imposed by the court would presumably have the effect of forcing improvement by way of interchange agreements rather than
additional certificates or extensions, if by the use of such agreements existing service could be rendered adequate. This policy
determination would in the court's opinion be more in keeping
with the objective of the regulation to avoid "unnecessary duplication of utility or transportation facilities . . . [r]eduction in
income and revenues of existing carriers ... [causing] the inevi2
table reduction of schedules and services."'
In another certification proceeding involving a carrier of
household goods to and from Calcasieu Parish, holders of existing certificates were successful in judicially upsetting favorable
commission action, again on an evidence basis. 13 Here, the deotherwise permissible, are too great, and may, by legislation designed to secure
uniformity or in other respects to protect the national interest in the commerce,
curtail to some extent the state's regulatory power." South Carolina Highway
Department v. Barnwell Brothers, 303 U.S. 177, 189-90 (1938).
10. Herrin Transportation Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 241
La. 174, 127 So.2d 541 (1961).
11. 127 So.2d at 542.
12. 127 So.2d at 544-45.
13. Wisdom Moving and Storage, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,
241 La. 28, 127 So.2d 188 (1961).
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cision seemed to turn on the demands for evidence showing that
a granted certificate would materially promote public convenience and necessity. The applicant showed evidence of substantial population and industrial growth in the area, clearly some
relevant evidence in favor of certification. But such evidence
was deemed no basis for inferring inadequacy of present service. 14 As a satisfactory showing of inadequacy of present service, the court alluded to another case decided at the same term
where, in addition to showing a tremendous population growth,
there was a showing that inconvenience and trouble in moving
had been experienced, adding up to "substantial moving delays."' 5 The earlier case alluded to, the Rubion Transfer & Storage case, incidentally, was illustrative of court and commission
seeing eye to eye on the role of additional certifications in sharpening competition where existing certificate holders may be neglecting their opportunities and responsibilities. This aspect of
the case was played up almost accidentally, since applicant had
been certificated and operating for a time before a prior certificate holder protested that he had received no notice of hearing
on the application. Hearings were then held and prior certificate holder testified that there was insufficient business for the
one holder because of cut-rate non-certified movers operating in
the area. But applicant was able to show that he was doing very
well and already expanding his facilities because of the demand
in the period since issuance of his certificate. 16 The court approved issuance of the certificate by the commission, noting approvingly that "a certificate of convenience and necessity previously issued should not operate as an exclusive franchise and
17
be utilized to foster indifferent service to the public.'
In still another certification proceeding, the commission was
found to have correctly interpreted legislative intent in concluding that a certificate may be transferred within less than six
months of its issuance upon a showing that failure to use was
attributable to financial insolvency under a statute which
authorized such transfers if failure to use was attributable to
"bankruptcy, receivership, or other legal proceedings, or to other
causes beyond his or its control.""' The court was of the opinion
14. 127 So.2d at 190.
15. Rubion Transfer & Storage Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,
240 La. 440, 123 So.2d 880 (1960).
16. Id. at 447-48, 123 So.2d at 882-83.
17. Ibid.
18. S.A. Harris Transfer & Storage, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 240 La. 1059, 127 So.2d 148 (1961).
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that the final phrase evidenced a legislative intent to include financial difficulties which might be preliminary to bankruptcy or
receivership as a cause beyond certificate holder's control "unless it is shown that the defaulting permittee contributed to his
9
financial straits."'
Throughout the cases coming up from the commission, the
court has freely substituted its judgment on issues of both fact
and law, relying upon the grant of broad review powers to the
court by the legislature in providing as it has that "the court
may affirm the order of the Commission complained of, or it
may change, modify, alter, or set it aside, as justice may require. ' 20 Of course, modification of commission action will be
granted only upon a showing that "the findings and conclusions
of the Commission do not conform to the law and are not supported by the evidence" and, in such proceeding, commission orders are "entitled to great weight."' 2 1 The legislature has shown
no disposition to limit such scope of review although it could
clearly do so if it chose ;22 however, station closings, at least,
seem presently to require judicial detachment to apply the financial criteria and standards of public interest deemed applicable
to these cases. It is interesting to consider in juxtaposition to
the Public Service Commission cases the eminent domain cases
precipitated by the building of new super-highways through
town and country; here, the legislature and the constitutional
electorate have closed off from judicial review entirely the determination of whether land taken ostensibly for highway use
is taken for a public use; the court has recently restated that
"the owner of land expropriated has no constitutional right to
have the department's decision as to the necessity thereof reviewed in judicial proceedings. '' 23 The rationale is stated to be
that "to permit judicial review and determination of each one
of thousands of parcels of property necessarily taken to construct a highway ... would be to impede the operation and construction to a point that would completely paralyze the' Depart24
ment of Highways."
19.
20.
21.
22.
of its
Work

Id. at 1066, 127 So.2d at 150.
LA. R.S. 45:1192 (1950).
240 La. at 668, 124 So.2d at 902.
As witness the court's acquiescence in limitations placed upon the scope
review in Civil Service cases. LA. CONST. art. 14, § 15(o) (1). See The
of the Supreme Court for the 1957-1958 Term - Administrative Law, 19
LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 362 (1959).
23; State v. Ray Guidry, 240 La. 516, 522, 124 So.2d 531, 533 (1960).
24. Id. at 525, 124 So.2d at 534.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXII

Rate Regulation
This term saw a rather lengthy footnote added to a rate decision which the court handed down in 1957.25 In a Public Service Commission order which the court upheld at that time, it was
provided that the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company should, among other things, reduce all intrastate rates and
charges by 20 percent per call. 28 In complying with that order,

the utility took the position that it did not have to reduce nor to
make refunds as to charges on intrastate toll messages originating in an exchange of an independent connecting company on a
"sent paid" basis or terminating there on a "received collect"
basis. It relied upon the theory that such calls were not calls by
Southern Bell customers since they were collected for by independent connecting companies with periodic settlements being
made pursuant to agreements.27 Thus, on a message originating
on a Southern Bell exchange on a "sent paid" basis, utilizing an
independent connecting toll line, a lower rate was paid than on
the identical message originating as a "sent paid" message in an
independent exchange although utilizing the identical toll and
exchange equipment. 28 The commission characterized this result
as "anomalous and discriminatory" and, after hearing, ordered
the utility to reduce rates and make appropriate refunds to the
extent of 20 percent of Southern Bell rates and charges contained in intercompany calls as to which collections were made
by the independent companies. 29 The court upheld this order and
a corollary provision that such refunds be made for Southern
Bell by the independent companies with costs to be defrayed by
Southern Bell.s0
There was sharp disagreement in the court as to whether the
commission's order should be upheld, not so much as to the fact
of discrimination but as to whether the utility, having refunded
and reduced revenues, as it argued, in excess of the test period
dollar amount of reduction ordered by the commission, it could
now be ordered to make any further reductions, even to remedy
25. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Louisiana Public Service

Commission, 232 La. 446, 94 So.2d 431 (1957).
26. Id. at 451, 94 So.2d at 433.
27. Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Co. (La. Comm.), 34 P.U.R.3d 599, 600 (1960).
28. Id. at 601.
29. Id. at 602.
30. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,
134 So.2d 61 (La. 1961).
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discriminations created in making the refunds and reductions.8 1
A majority thought the dollar amount of reduction applicable
only to the test period and properly translated into tariff effect
on the basis of the data for that period by directing local pay
telephone calls to be reduced from 10¢ to 5¢ and intrastate tolls
by 20 percent.3 2 The utility sought to demonstrate that the effect
of these decreases was to exceed the ordered reduction of $3,940,000 both as to the test period and as to subsequent periods; in
utility calculations, however, no effect was given to the factor of
acceleration in use resulting from a lower rate and hence the
demonstration was rejected as inconclusive.3 The effect of the
majority decision was also to reject the argument implicit in the
utility's approach, that, even conceded discrimination in the decrease and refund procedures could not be remedied if the return
authorized for the test period was not earned in subsequent
periods. The commission argued, in opposing grant of a rehearing, that the remedy for any inadequacies in a prior rate determination lies in obtaining an increase upon the basis of new
test period data rather than by discriminatory withholding of a
share of the refunds from some telephone users simply because
they had paid tolls and charges for the utility's services through
independent telephone companies instead of directly to the util34
ity.

In the actual sequence of events in the case of this utility,

such an increase was subsequently granted. 35
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Robert L. Roland*
Although with one exception hereinafter discussed the current session of the court did not see the rendition of any case of
unusual import in the field of state and local taxation, it did produce several decisions of interest. Collector of Revenue v. Frost
and its companion cases' proved that a taxpayer can be as tena31. Id.

at 71.

32. Id. at 66.
33. Id. at 72-73.
34. Ibid. Supreme Court Docket No. 45,493, Commission's Memorandum in
Opposition to Application for Rehearing.
35. See Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Louisiana Public Service
Commission, 239 La. 175, 118 So.2d 372 (1960).
*Member, Baton Rouge Bar; former Collector of Revenue for the State of
Louisiana; and Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 240 La. 1067, 127 So.2d 151 (1961) ; Collector of Revenue v. Whited, 240

